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Abstract
Background: Cost-sharing programs are often too complex to be easily understood by the average insured
individual. Consequently, it is often difficult to determine the amount of expenses in advance. This may preclude
well-informed decisions of insured individuals to adhere to medical treatment advised by the treating physician.
Preliminary research has showed that the uncertainty in these cost-sharing payments are affected by four design
characteristics, i.e. 1) type of payments (copayments, coinsurances or deductibles), 2) rate of payments, 3) annual
caps on cost-sharing and 4) moment that these payments must be made (directly at point of care or billed
afterwards by the insurer).
Methods: An online discrete choice experiment was used to assess the extent to which design characteristics of
cost-sharing programs affect the decision of individuals to adhere to recommended care (prescribed medications,
ordered diagnostic tests and referrals to medical specialist care). Analyses were performed using mixed multinomial
logits.
Results: The questionnaire was completed by 7921 members of a patient organization. Analyses showed that 1) cost-
sharing programs that offer clear information in advance on actual expenses that are billed afterwards, stimulate adherence
to care recommended by the treating physician; 2) the relative importance of the design characteristics differed between
respondents who reported to have forgone health care due to cost-sharing and those who did not; 3) price-awareness
among respondents was limited; 4) the utility derived from attributes and respondents’ characteristics were positively
correlated; 5) an optimized cost-sharing program revealed an adherence of more than 72.9% among those who reported
to have forgone health care.
Conclusions: The analyses revealed that less complex cost-sharing programs stimulate adherence to recommended care. If
these programs are redesigned accordingly, individuals who had reported to have forgone a health service recommended
by their treating physician due to cost-sharing, would be more likely to use this service. Such redesigned programs provide a
policy option to reduce adverse health effects of cost-sharing in these groups. Considering the upcoming shift from volume-
based to value-based health care provision, insights into the characteristics of a cost-sharing program that stimulates the use
of recommended care may help to design value-based insurance plans.
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Background
Policy makers around the world have introduced
cost-sharing programs to control rising health care ex-
penditure. These programs introduce financial incentives
for insured individuals to increase their awareness of
health care costs. Increased cost-awareness is believed to
lead to a well-informed decision to use health care,
where expected medical benefits and costs have been
considered [1]. Numerous studies have shown that
cost-sharing reduces the demand of care [1, 2]. The
RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) showed that
higher cost-sharing leads to a decrease in demand of
care with no effect on health except for those with the
lowest income and poor initial health. The HIE also
showed that cost-sharing reduces utilization of both care
‘recommended’ by physicians and care that was ‘non-re-
commended’ [3]. Recommended care consists of health
services that have relatively high medical benefits as
assessed by physicians, whereas non-recommended care
is judged by physicians to have relatively little to no
medical benefit [3]. In many European countries (e.g.
the Netherlands, UK, Denmark) and in some US health
plans, General Practitioners (GPs) act as gatekeepers for
the more costly specialist care [4, 5]. As gatekeepers,
GPs assess the necessity of care at the individuals’ first
contact with health care and decide whether to refer
them. GP care may also be exempt from cost-sharing to
ensure initial care-seeking decision, but the referred
(recommended) care is generally subject to cost-sharing
[6, 7]. However, it is up to individuals to decide (i.e. indi-
viduals’ choice) to follow up on recommended care. In
literature, costs have been described as possible reason
for not using recommended care [8, 9]. It remains un-
clear which characteristics of a cost-sharing program
stimulate the decision of individuals to follow up on
recommended care and to what extent.
A common problem with cost-sharing programs is
that they are too complex to be easily understood by the
average insured individual [6, 10]. The level of comple-
xity makes it often difficult to determine the amount of
expenses in advance and may preclude well-informed
decisions. For example, providers are often unable to in-
form the individual on the combination of treatments
and prices in advance, and cost-sharing may only be ap-
plicable for specific health services, it may vary across
health plans and some groups may be exempt from
these payments. Therefore, in many instances, insured
individuals only know the final amount they need to pay
when they actually receive their bill. Moreover, some in-
dividuals are more able to comprehend complex health
information than others. This factor is referred as health
literacy, i.e. the ability to process and understand basic
information needed to make appropriate health deci-
sions [11]. Given that limited health literacy is more
concentrated in specific subgroups of the population
(e.g. individuals in poor health, with low socio-economic
status) [12], these individuals are therefore less able to
determine the amount of their expenses in advance. Un-
certainty over expenses may cause some individuals not
to use health care they would have used had they known
these expenses in advance. Therefore, this study aims at
understanding which characteristics of a cost-sharing
program reduce its complexity in order to improve
adherence to recommended care.
Cost-sharing design characteristics
We have examined a number of cost-sharing programs
from the perspective of an insured individual to assess
which characteristics contribute to their complexity. This
involved a review of the literature provided and expert con-
sultations (a summary is provided in Additional file 1). Our
research has showed that, in general, the complexity of
cost-sharing programs is primarily affected by two design
choices made by policy makers: the actual amount of
cost-sharing payments and the moment these payments
must be paid.
With respect to the first design choice, there are three
key characteristics that determine these amounts. The
first characteristic, type of cost-sharing payments (i.e.
copayments, coinsurances and deductibles), affects how
the amount of cost-sharing is calculated. Copayments
consist of flat-rate fees per unit of care that result in
fixed fees known by insured individuals in advance. In
contrast, for coinsurances (fees equal to a percentage of
the price per unit of care) and for deductibles (insured
individuals bear costs up to an annual fixed amount
while the health insurer (HI) covers all exceeding costs)
the actual amount depends on actual prices of health
services. Given that price transparency is generally
limited [13], it is difficult for insured individuals to deter-
mine the exact amount of payments in advance. Hence,
coinsurances and deductibles contribute to uncertainty
over the actual amount of cost-sharing payments.
The second characteristic is the rate of cost-sharing
payments since levels vary across different health ser-
vices and even within a given service. For example, rates
for prescribed medication are generally lower than those
for visits to a medical specialist. Moreover, different tiers
may be applied to take the effectiveness of the pre-
scribed medication into account. Individuals pay a lower
rate if their medication is considered evidence-based
(e.g. insulin for diabetes patients) [14].
The third characteristic, annual caps on cost-sharing,
relates to protection mechanisms generally built into
cost-sharing programs which limit the actual amount of
cost-sharing payments an individual will have to make
per year. These caps may vary across specific groups
(e.g. older individuals), health services (e.g. separate caps
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for hospital stays and medications) or income (e.g. low-in-
come groups). Additionally, some groups may be entitled
to multiple caps simultaneously. Given the administrative
process required for billing cost-sharing payments, indivi-
duals may not always have an up-to-date overview of
applicable caps. Furthermore, not all individuals are fully
aware of all the caps applicable to their individual situation.
Hence, the complexity in the design of annual caps also in-
creases uncertainty concerning the amount of cost-sharing
payments.
The second design choice relates to the moment that
cost-sharing payments must be paid and reflects a fourth
design characteristic of cost-sharing programs. Insured
individuals may pay their cost-sharing bill directly at the
point of care, namely where the health services are
actually provided or bought (e.g. when picking up
medication at a pharmacy). Alternatively, the entire bill
is sent to a third-party payer (e.g. HI) who bills indivi-
duals afterwards for their cost-sharing payments only.
Given that the administrative process may take several
weeks or even months to complete, this introduces un-
certainty as to the moment that cost-sharing payments
need to be paid.
Policy choices in the design of cost-sharing programs
Most cost-sharing programs in developed countries involve
combinations of the four aforementioned design characteris-
tics. For example, in the US, copayments are generally paid
for prescribed medication and this is combined with different
tiers to encourage individuals to use lower-cost alternatives.
Annual out-of-pocket costs are limited to $3500 per person
or $9400 per family while specific health services (e.g. pre-
natal and postnatal care) are exempt from cost-sharing [15].
France applies fixed copayments for prescribed medication
(€0.50 per drug), a combination of coinsurance (20%) and
copayments (€16–20) for inpatient hospital services and
again a combination for a consult of the GP or specialist [5].
Current cost-sharing programs have been designed in the
context of Fee-For-Service as dominant provider payment
model. Considering the upcoming shift from volume-based
to value-based health care provision, new payment models
are increasingly used [16]. For example, bundled payments
are used to pay one overall price for the full cycle of care
that may cover health services of multiple providers.
Cost-sharing programs may be designed to stimulate the
use of in-bundle care rather than to reduce moral hazard
[17]. Hence, insights into the characteristics of a
cost-sharing program that stimulates recommended care
may help to design value-based insurance plans.
Our study
In order to examine the effect of less complex cost-sharing
programs on the adherence to recommended care, we
conducted a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to estimate
preferences with respect to the four cost-sharing design
characteristics. In the experimental settings of a DCE, re-
spondents evaluate hypothetical, but realistic cost-sharing
programs based on the four design characteristics. Al-
though the programs are per definition hypothetical, we
tried to reflect real-world decision making of respondents
in the DCE and focused on health services covered by the
Dutch mandatory basic health insurance, ordered or pre-
scribed by the treating physician (recommended care) and
subject to a deductible (€385 in 2016) that is billed after-
wards by the HI.
To recap, the purpose of this study is to assess to what
extent four design characteristics (namely the type and
rate of cost-sharing payments, annual caps and the
moment that these payments are paid) affect the deci-
sion to utilize (i.e. follow up on) recommended care by
the treating physician, and whether this response to
cost-sharing differs across individuals.
Methods
To answer our research question, we conducted a DCE
among patients who have received follow-up care recom-
mended by their treating physician and had to decide
whether or not to follow up on this referral. In this survey
technique, respondents are presented with several hypo-
thetical scenarios (choice sets) consisting of two or more
alternatives (i.e. cost-sharing programs) that systematically
vary the attributes (i.e. the four design characteristics)
across given levels. Respondents are asked to choose their
most preferred alternative in each choice set. In accor-
dance with economic theory [18, 19], the chosen alterna-
tives are considered to be those which yield the highest
utility and reflect the respondent’s latent preferences.
In the DCE, we focused on three types of health services
recommended by the treating physician (i.e. prescribed
medications, ordered diagnostic tests and referrals to
medical specialists for consultation or treatment (specialist
care)) and subject to cost-sharing, specifically deductibles.
As stated, we did not focus on the initial decision of in-
sured individuals to visit their GP exempted from
cost-sharing, but focused on their decision to follow up on
care recommended by the treating physician and subject
to cost-sharing payments.
Attributes and levels
The selection of attributes was based on preliminary re-
search as described in the background section. Hence,
the four attributes (one for each design characteristic)
were included in the DCE (shown in Table 1). We aimed
to keep the levels of the second attribute (rate of
payments) independent from the first attribute (type of
payments) and used one general price per type of health
service to determine levels (€9.50 for medication; €250
for diagnostic tests; €2000 for specialist care). For
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example, the reference level in specialist care reflected a
rate of payment equal to €200 in both copayments and
coinsurances (10%*€2000 = €200) payments. A few levels
were rounded to the nearest whole number to reduce
the cognitive burden of the DCE (e.g. for diagnostic
tests, the reference level in case of coinsurances (€80/
€250 = 32%) was rounded to 30%). For medication, the
lowest rate of copayments was assigned based on feed-
back of experts as they had perceived the difference of
€1 with the subsequent level to be too little and
unrealistic.
Experimental design
Given that annual caps are fixed for a whole year, vary-
ing caps within a choice set was not considered realistic.
Instead, this attribute only varied across choice sets. To
achieve this, we used only the first (type of payments),
second (rate of payments) and fourth (moment of
payment) attribute to generate a D-efficient design
(main-effects, zero priors) blocked into four blocks
(three choice sets per block) and included this design
twice in questionnaire to incorporate the third attribute
(annual caps on cost-sharing). By doing so, for each type
of health service two blocks were included in the ques-
tionnaire, i.e. three choice sets with ‘half cap’ and three
choice sets with ‘full cap’. Each choice set consisted of
two unlabeled hypothetical cost-sharing programs and
an opt-out (i.e. the option to forgo health care without
having to make any payments) of which the respondents
were asked to choose their most preferred option. The
opt-out was included to better reflect real-life settings in
which insured individuals may choose not to use health
care [20]. To optimize the validity and reliability of our
results, we wanted to remain as close as possible to the
real-world decision making of respondents. Therefore,
respondents were instructed to use the most recent situ-
ation as context situation in the DCE in which they had
visited their treating physician and received a follow-up
for one of the health services (medication, diagnostic
tests or specialist care) subject to cost-sharing payments,
specifically deductibles payments, within the last 2 years,
and had forgone the given service due to these payments
(group: forgoing health care). If respondents had not
forgone these health services during this period, they
were instructed to use the most recent situation in
which they had used the aforementioned health
services recommended by the treating physician
(group: utilizing health care). Therefore, respondents
completed 0, 6, 12 or 18 choice sets depending on
whether they had been recommended the given health
service, i.e. either have been used or forgone pre-
scribed medication, ordered diagnostic tests or re-
ferred specialist care in the last 2 years.
Questionnaire
In addition to the DCE, the questionnaire contained ques-
tions concerning the deductibles paid by the respondent,
respondents’ personal and socio-economic characteristics,
health and sense of mastery, and open-ended feedback
questions (the full questionnaire is provided in
Additional file 2). Sense of mastery refers to the extent
to which individuals perceive life events (e.g. the de-
velopment of chronic conditions) as being under their
control, as opposed to being determined by external
factors [21]. Sense of mastery was included because it
has been shown to modify the impact of these events
on health [22]. The questionnaire was piloted online
using a small sample of the study population (n = 269,
not included in analyses) resulting in minor adjust-
ments in wording but no changes in attributes, levels
or experimental design. To estimate the minimum
sample size (main effects), we used Johnson and
Orme’s rule-of-thumb [23, 24]. The minimum number
of respondents was estimated to be 84 per block.
Study population
We selected the online panel of the Dutch Patient Fede-
ration. Panel members are frequent users of health care
and are more likely to face cost-sharing payments
making them highly relevant for our study. In March
and April 2016, all panel members (n = 23,394) were
asked by email to complete the online questionnaire on
a voluntary basis.
Table 1 Attributes and levels per type of health service
Attributes Types of health service
Medication Diagnostic tests Specialist care
1) Type of payments
Type1 Copayments
Type2 (reference) Coinsurances
2) Rate of payments
Rate1 €2 / 40% €40 / 15% €100 / 5%
Rate2 €4 / 50% €50 / 20% €140 / 7%
Rate3 (reference) €7 / 70% €80 / 30% €200 / 10%
3) Annual caps on cost-sharing
Cap1 Half cap+
Cap2 (reference) Full cap+
4) Moment of payment
Moment1 Afterwards billed by health insurer
Moment2 (reference) Directly at point of care
+The situation with a full remaining annual cap (full cap) reflected a situation
with no previously made payments while in the other situation (half cap)
payments had been previously made equal to half of the annual cap. The full
cap was set equal to the current Dutch deductible (in 2016, €385)
Salampessy et al. BMC Health Services Research          (2018) 18:797 Page 4 of 14
Data analysis
Data was analyzed separately per group (respondents re-
ported having forgone health care and those who did
not) for each type of health service. In total, six analyses
were performed using mixed multinomial logits
(MMNL) to account for the clustering of data (i.e. the
same respondent completed multiple choice sets) and to
account for random taste in preferences [20]. Each
MMNL modelled the following equation:
V ij ¼ β1  Type1þ β2  Rate1þ β3  Rate2þ β4
 Cap1þ β5  Cap1  Type1þ β6  Cap1
 Rate1þ β7  Cap1  Rate2þ β8  Cap1
Moment1þ β9 Moment1þ β10
 Alternative Specific Constant optoutð Þ
þ εij ð1Þ
In Eq. 1, the utility that individual i derived from a
hypothetical cost-sharing scheme alternative in choice
set j is reflected by Vij and characterized by the combin-
ation of different levels of attributes (β1-β4, β9). Labels of
the included variables correspond with the attributes’
labels used in Table 1. Given its fixed nature, the third
attribute (annual caps on cost-sharing) was interacted
(β5-β8) with the other attributes. An alternative specific
constant was also included (β10) to reflect the different
nature of the opt-out option and the average derived un-
observed utility. Given its coding (1 if the opt-out option
was chosen and 0 otherwise), a positive sign indicates a
general preference to forgo health care in any cost-shar-
ing scheme while a negative sign indicates a general
preference to utilize health care in similar programs.
The error term (ε) was assumed to be normally distrib-
uted. Effects coding was used for all attributes. Coeffi-
cients for the omitted levels were calculated as the
negative sum of the estimated coefficients [25].
To make our findings representative to the Dutch
general population, we repeated our main analyses using
inverse probability weighting (IPW) based on age,
gender, educational level and EQ5D scores [26]. Weights
were computed using iterative proportional fitting (also
referred as ‘raking’) such that the weighted marginal to-
tals of our sample closely matched those of the total
population [27, 28].
Additional analyses were performed to identify differ-
ences in preferences across subgroups by using interaction
terms between attributes and respondents’ characteristics
(i.e. subjective health status, income, financial situation,
sense of mastery and educational level). In interest of
brevity, the modelled MMNLs are described in
Additional file 3.
To assess the effect of an ‘optimally’ designed cost-
sharing program, we used sample enumeration to calcu-
late average choice probabilities separately for both
groups per type of health service. These probabilities re-
flect the expected share of respondents that would
choose the service if cost-sharing programs were de-
signed according to the respondents’ preferences [20].
First, we calculated utility scores for an alternative to
use the health service in an optimally designed program,
and an alternative to forgo this service (opt-out option).
The alternative yielding the highest utility score was as-
sumed to be chosen by the respondent. Since random
parameters were included, choice probabilities could not
be calculated directly. Hence, a random sample of 5000
respondents was simulated and corresponding proba-
bilities were calculated using 1/(1 + exp.-V) in which V
reflects the utility derived from ‘optimally’ designed
cost-sharing program [20]. Subsequently, the average
choice probability was calculated by taking the average
of all simulated probabilities.
Experimental designs were generated in SAS/STAT
software version 9.3 [29]. In the final data analyses,
random parameters assumed a normal distribution and
estimated based on 5000 Halton draws. MMNL models
were estimated in Stata 14.1 [30]. Model fit was assessed
based on -2log likelihood functions. Results were consi-
dered statistically significant if p-values ≤.05.
Results
Study population
The questionnaire was completed by 8734 respondents
(response rate 37.3%) of whom 813 respondents were ex-
cluded for various reasons described in Additional file 4.
Of the 7921 included respondents (Table 2), 1048 respon-
dents (13.2%) reported having forgone health care recom-
mended by their treating physician due to cost-sharing
payments (group: forgoing health care). These respondents
were, on average, significantly lower educated and had a
lower net income, a worse financial situation, a lower level
of health and mastery compared to those who had
not forgone health care recommended by their treat-
ing physician due to cost-sharing payments (group:
utilizing health care).
Preferences
A two-axes model describing the level of complexity of
cost-sharing programs is used to present the key findings
of the study (Fig. 1). The horizontal axis describes the
attribute moment of payments while the vertical axis
describes the attribute type of payments. The complete
output used for the two-axes model (i.e. unweighted
analyses) is shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5. As illustrated in
Fig. 1, respondents preferred the same levels of each at-
tribute, but its relative importance differed across groups
(forgoing and utilizing health care). For both groups,
preferences differed across the three types of health
services.
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With respect to type of payment, respondents pre-
ferred copayments over coinsurances for medication (co-
efficient (SE): 1.224 (0.095) and 1.768 (0.060)) and
diagnostic tests (coefficient (SE): 0.664 (0.116) and 0.773
(0.057)), and preferred coinsurances for specialist care
(coefficient (SE): 0.933 (0.116) and 0.622 (0.064)).
Open-ended questions revealed that respondents were
generally unaware of the actual prices of health services
(a summary of answers is provided in Additional file 4).
They believed that coinsurances of an unknown price
would presumably result in lower fees compared to the
nominal fees of copayments. With respect to rate of pay-
ments, respondents preferred lowest rates over the
higher rates for all types of health services (coefficient
(SE): for medication: 0.696 (0.075) and 0.783 (0.033); for
diagnostic tests: 1.123 (0.102) and 0.643 (0.033); for spe-
cialist care: 0.612 (0.090) and 0.508 (0.035). The attribute
annual caps was non-significant for all types of health
services (coefficient (SE): for medication: 0.015 (0.052)
and − 0.025 (0.023); for diagnostic tests: − 0.005 (0.055)
Table 2 Characteristics of 7921 respondents included in the study
Total Forgoing health care (n = 1048) Utilizing health care (n = 6873)
Demographics
Age (in years)** Mean (sd) 62.3 (11.1) 57.8 (10.9) 63.0 (11.0)
Gender (%)** Men 47.9 39.4 49.2
Socio-economic status
Education level (%)** Low 24.9 27.5 24.6
Moderate 32.0 35.6 31.4
High 43.1 36.9 44.0
Monthly net income (%)** < €1000 8.4 19.5 6.7
€1001–€2000 30.9 43.4 29.0
€2001–€3000 24.4 15.7 25.7
€3001–€4000 12.1 5.0 13.2
>€4000€ 6.7 2.1 7.4
Unknown or not-disclosed 17.5 14.3 18.0
Financial situation (%)** Running up debts or 6.7 20.4 4.7
Using savings 16.6 24.3 15.4
Precisely enough to live from 33.7 36.5 33.2
Saving a small amount 37.0 16.5 40.2
Saving a large amount 6.0 2.3 6.5
Health
Subjective health (%)** Very poor 2.8 3.6 2.7
Poor 16.1 18.1 15.7
Moderate 41.7 46.2 41.1
Good 35.3 27.8 36.4
Very good 4.1 4.3 4.1
Chronic conditions (%)* One or more 84.0 81.6 84.3
Health Status, EQ-5D-5 L** Mean (sd) .76 (.20) .71 (.23) .77 (.20)
Sense of mastery, Pearlin ** Mean (sd) 22.3 (5.8) 20.5 (5.9) 22.6 (5.7)
Respondents per health service
Number (% of group)+ Medication 475 (45.3%) 6277 (91.3%)
Diagnostic tests 738 (70.4%) 5510 (80.2%)
Specialist care 662 (63.2%) 4702 (68.4%)
Respondents were classified as divided in two groups; respondents reported having forgone health care due to deductibles (group: forgoing health care) and
those did not (group: utilizing health care). Health status was measured by the Euroqol-5D-5 L questionnaire and valued according to Dutch tariffs. Scores range
from 0 (a health status equal to death) to 1 (a health status equal to perfect health). The sense of mastery was measured by the Pearlin Mastery Scale Test. Seven
statements (e.g. “I have little control of events that happen to me”) are scored on a five point Likert scale. Summed scores range from the lowest possible score of
7 (lacking sense of mastery) to the highest possible score of 35 (complete sense of mastery) [21]
** p-value ≤.01, * p-value ≤.05, +as percentage of group forgoing health care (n = 1048) and utilizing health care (n = 6873) respectively, sd: standard deviation
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and − 0.003 (0.022); for specialist care: 0.009 (0.059) and
− 0.024 (0.022) implying that respondents’ choices were
unaffected by the level of these caps. With respect to
moment of payment, respondents generally preferred re-
ceiving a bill afterwards from the HI over direct pay-
ments at point of care (coefficient (SE): for medication:
0.082 (0.045) and 1.590 (0.065); for diagnostic tests:
0.414 (0.086) and 3.416 (0.108); for specialist care: 0.595
(0.091) and 4.086 (0.125). Respondents indicated in the
open-ended questions that if payments were billed after-
wards by the HI, they could arrange a payment plan with
the HI and still use the health service.
The relative importance of the attributes differed be-
tween the two groups. Overall, the group forgoing health
care considered the attribute type of payments as the
most important whereas the group utilizing health care
considered the attribute moment of payments as most
important.
Results of the IPW analyses were equal to those of the
unweighted analyses in terms of the direction of coeffi-
cients and preferred levels within attributes. Considering
corresponding standard errors, mean coefficients in un-
weighted analyses were included in the range of mean
and standard error of coefficients in the IPW analyses.
However, note that small differences were observed for
the attribute moment of payments, i.e. higher coefficients
for the group forgoing health care and lower coefficients
for the group utilizing health care.
Although not all interactions terms were significant
for both groups and across all characteristics of respon-
dents, in general, a positive correlation was observed
between the utility derived from the attributes and these
characteristics (i.e. utility increased when a score on the
characteristic increased, and vice versa). The complete
output of these models is provided in Additional file 3.
For example, respondents in good health derived more
utility from copayments, low rates and a bill afterwards
by the HI, and thus are more likely to use health care in
a given cost-sharing program than those in poor health.
Effect of optimizing design to achieve higher adherence
If the current cost-sharing program was redesigned in
accordance to respondents’ preferences of each group
per type of health service, the majority of the group
forgoing health care would choose to use health care
recommended by their treating physician. Simulated
rates of using health care equaled 79.8% for medication,
72.9% for diagnostic tests and 74.6% for specialist care.
Higher simulated rates were found for the group
utilizing health care (88.7% for medication; 91.3% for
diagnostic tests; 92.1% for specialist care).
Fig. 1 Ratio of derived utility moment of payment and type of payments, standardized by rate of payments. Coefficients of the attributes
moment of payments and type of payments have been standardized by dividing the utility derived of each attribute by the utility derived from the
most preferred level of the attribute rate of payments, i.e. rate1. In only one analysis (for medication, group ‘Forgoing health care’), the coefficients
of the attribute moment of payments was not significant
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Discussion
Cost-sharing programs have been introduced in many
countries to increase cost-awareness among insured
individuals when using health care. However, these pro-
grams have also lead to non-adherence to health care
considered to be medically recommended by physicians
[1] [3]. A relevant policy question is how to design these
programs in such way that use of recommended care is
stimulated non-differentially across subgroups. As one
of the first studies, we conducted a discrete choice
experiment (DCE) to assess the extent to which design
characteristics of cost-sharing programs affect the deci-
sion of individuals to use care recommended by their
treating physician.
The DCE revealed five main findings. First, prefer-
ences with respect to design characteristics (see Tables 3,
4 and 5) showed that less complex cost-sharing pro-
grams (i.e. copayments relative to coinsurances) improve
adherence to recommended care other things being
equal (ceteris paribus). Such programs offer clear
Table 3 Results from mixed multinomial logits (prescribed medication)
Health Service: Prescribed medication
Group: Forgoing health care Utilizing health care
Weighting: Unweighted Inverse Probability Weighting Unweighted Inverse Probability Weighting
Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE)
Variable:
Type of payments
-Copayments 1.224 (0.095)** 1.103 (0.428)* 1.768 (0.060)** 1.834 (0.237)**
-Coinsurances (reference) −1.224 (0.095)** −1.103 (0.428)* − 1.768 (0.060)** − 1.834 (0.237)**
Rate of payments
-Rate1 a 0.696 (0.075)** 0.994 (0.285)** 0.783 (0.033)** 0.901 (0.111)**
-Rate2 a 0.257 (0.065)** 0.471 (0.272) 0.502 (0.027)** 0.500 (0.089)**
-Rate3 a (reference) −0.953 (0.128)** −1.466 (0.547)** −1.285 (0.042)** − 1.401 (0.150)**
Annual caps on cost-sharing payment
-Half cap 0.015 (0.052) 0.180 (0.170) −0.025 (0.023) − 0.002 (0.055)
-Full cap (reference) −0.015 (0.052) −0.180 (0.170) 0.025 (0.023) 0.002 (0.055)
-Half cap * Copayments −0.020 (0.049 0.030 (0.102) −0.022 (0.017) −0.041 (0.053)
-Half cap * Rate1 a − 0.164 (0.065) 0.072 (0.285) − 0.053 (0.030) −0.199 (0.088)*
-Half cap * Rate2 a 0.040 (0.068) −0.568 (0.408) − 0.093 (0.036)* 0.070 (0.129)
-Half cap * Afterwards billed by health insurer 0.054 (0.048) −0.119 (0.191) 0.041 (0.018)* 0.077 (0.070)
Moment of payment
-Afterwards billed by health insurer 0.082 (0.045) 0.843 (0.254)** 1.590 (0.065)** 0.793 (0.198)**
-Directly at point of care (reference) −0.082 (0.045) −0.843 (0.254)** −1.590 (0.065)** − 0.793 (0.198)**
Alternative specific constant
-Opt-out option 2.308 (0.073)* 2.640 (0.605)** −0.332 (0.030)** −1.093 (0.187)**
SD of random parameters
Copayments 1.667 (0.094)** 1.733 (0.552)** 2.884 (0.080)** 2.650 (0.280)**
Rate1 a 0.765 (0.108)** 1.036 (0.471)* 1.064 (0.044)** 1.146 (0.152)**
Rate2 a 0.003 (0.247) 0.001 (0.005) 0.815 (0.042)** −0.746 (0.149)**
Afterwards billed by health insurer – – 3.692 (0.100)** 3.633 (0.409)**
Model
Number of individuals 475 475 6277 6277
Number of observations 8550 8550 112,986 112,986
Log-likelihood − 2082.340 − 1327.649 −22,780.000 −16,384.221
Model: mixed multinomial logits modelling eq. 1. Random parameters assumed a normal distribution and estimated based on 5000 Halton draws
SE Standard Error, SD Standard Deviation
a labels Prescribed medication: rate1 (€2/40%), rate2 (€4/50%), rate3 (€7/70%)
* = p-value≤.05, ** = p-value≤.01
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information on the cost-sharing payments in advance.
Furthermore, respondents preferred the afterwards billing
of cost-sharing payments by the health insurer (HI) over
direct payments at point of care. Although the afterwards
billing by the HI causes uncertainty over the moment
these payments must be paid by individuals, it does allow
them to arrange a payment plan with their HI.
Second, simulations of cost-sharing programs designed
in accordance with preferences of insured individuals
(optimally designed program) revealed promising results
as a large positive shift was observed for respondents
who reported having forgone health care due to
cost-sharing payments (group: forgoing health care). In
the redesigned program, the majority of this group
would use the recommended health service which they
had previously forgone (i.e. the rate of using health care
increased from 0.0% to 72.9–79.8%). For respondents
who reported not having forgone health care due to
cost-sharing payments (group: utilizing health care), a
small negative shift was observed (i.e. the rate of using
Table 4 Results from mixed multinomial logits (diagnostic tests)
Health Service: Diagnostic tests
Group: Forgoing health care Utilizing health care
Weighting: Unweighted Inverse Probability Weighting Unweighted Inverse Probability Weighting
Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE)
Variable:
Type of payments
-Copayments 0.664 (0.116)** 1.041 (0.457)* 0.773 (0.057)** 1.032 (0.234)**
-Coinsurances (reference) − 0.664 (0.116)** − 1.041 (0.457)* − 0.773 (0.057)** − 1.032 (0.234)**
Rate of payments
-Rate1 a 1.123 (0.102)** 1.758 (0.759)* 0.643 (0.033)** 0.841 (0.106)**
-Rate2 a 0.522 (0.089)** 0.202 (0.350) 0.424 (0.030)** 0.334 (0.092)**
-Rate3 a (reference) −1.646 (0.133)** −1.959 (0.760)* − 1.067 (0.042)** −1.174 (0.150)**
Annual caps on cost-sharing payment
-Half cap −0.005 (0.055) 0.035 (0.207) −0.003 (0.022) 0.039 (0.036)
-Full cap (reference) 0.005 (0.055) −0.035 (0.207) 0.003 (0.022) −0.039 (0.036)
-Half cap * Copayments −0.050 (0.052) −0.266 0.240) − 0.057 (0.019)** −0.084 (0.063)
-Half cap * Rate1 a 0.037 (0.081) 0.227 (0.347) −0.056 (0.033) −0.103 (0.078)
-Half cap * Rate2 a − 0.147 (0.090) −0.884 (0.363)* − 0.019 (0.038) − 0.053 (0.121)
-Half cap * Afterwards billed by health insurer 0.017 (0.057) 0.226 (0.231) −0.079 (0.020)** −0.221 (0.079)**
Moment of payment
-Afterwards billed by health insurer 0.414 (0.086)** 1.581 (0.831) 3.416 (0.108)** 2.660 (0.390)**
-Directly at point of care (reference) −0.414 (0.086)** −1.581 (0.831) −3.416 (0.108)** −2.660 (0.390)**
Alternative specific constant
-Opt-out option 3.752 (0.146)** 4.503 (1.060)** 0.556 (0.033)** 0.319 (0.247)
SD of random parameters
Copayments 2.702 (0.143)** 2.599 (0.689)** 3.236 (0.092)** 3.480 (0.451)**
Rate1 a −1.486 (0.128)** −2.132 (0.804)** −0.907 (0.048)** 0.974 (0.161)**
Rate2 a 1.412 (0.130)** 2.338 (1.035)* 0.827 (0.047)** 0.789 (0.172)**
Afterwards billed by health insurer 1.908 (0.113)** 3.829 (1.098)** 4.690 (0.132)** 4.521 (0.591)**
Model
Number of individuals 738 738 5510 5510
Number of observations 13,284 13,284 99,180 99,180
Log-likelihood − 3187.780 − 3180.645 −20,580.500 −16,919.590
Model: mixed multinomial logits modelling eq. 1. Random parameters assumed a normal distribution and estimated based on 5000 Halton draws
SE Standard Error, SD Standard Deviation
a labels Diagnostic tests: rate1 (€40/15%), rate2 (€50/20%), rate3 (€80/30%)
* = p-value≤.05, ** = p-value≤.01
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health care decreased from 100.0% to 88.7–92.1%)
although the large majority would still use the recom-
mended health service. Given the distribution of respon-
dents’ characteristics across both groups (see Table 2),
the redesigned program does, ceteris paribus, result in a
more equal distribution of these characteristics (e.g. a
lower concentration of poor health or low net income
amongst individuals who forgo health care). In the con-
text of bundled payments, policy makers may apply an
optimally designed program to stimulate the use of
in-bundle care and combine this with coinsurance fees
to discourage use of out-bundle care or out-of-network
providers (bundle leakage) [31].
Third, the difference in relative importance of attri-
butes found between both groups (see Tables 3, 4 and 5)
corresponds with the difference in demand-response to
the current cost-sharing program (deductibles that are
billed afterwards by the HI). Deductibles (similar to co-
insurances) create uncertainty in the amount of expenses
as they depend on actual prices. Given the most
Table 5 Results from mixed multinomial logits (specialist care)
Health Service: Specialist care
Group: Forgoing health care Utilizing health care
Weighting: Unweighted Inverse Probability Weighting Unweighted Inverse Probability Weighting
Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE)
Variable:
Type of payments
-Copayments −0.933 (0.116)** − 0.471 (0.209)* − 0.622 (0.064)** −0.572 (0.227)*
-Coinsurances (reference) 0.933 (0.116)** 0.471 (0.209)* 0.622 (0.064)** 0.572 (0.227)*
Rate of payments
-Rate1 a 0.612 (0.090)** 0.591 (0.180)** 0.508 (0.035)** 0.451 (0.137)**
-Rate2 a 0.143 (0.079) 0.173 (0.129) 0.244 (0.028)** 0.237 (0.089)**
-Rate3 a (reference) −0.755 (0.100)** −0.764 (0.264)** −0.752 (0.039)** − 0.689 (0.143)**
Annual caps on cost-sharing payment
-Half cap 0.009 (0.059) 0.010 (0.115) −0.024 (0.022) −0.036 (0.045)
-Full cap (reference) −0.009 (0.059) −0.010 (0.115) 0.024 (0.022) 0.036 (0.045)
-Half cap * Copayments −0.075 (0.058) −0.069 (0.117) 0.037 (0.020) 0.040 (0.063)
-Half cap * Rate1 a 0.078 (0.089) −0.023 (0.146) −0.116 (0.034)** − 0.081 (0.106)
-Half cap * Rate2 a −0.004 (0.095) 0.110 (0.175) 0.006 (0.040) −0.032 (0.128)
-Half cap * Afterwards billed by health insurer −0.058 (0.058) −0.166 (0.094) − 0.054 (0.021)* 0.046 (0.083)
Moment of payment
-Afterwards billed by health insurer 0.595 (0.091)** 0.452 (0.135)** 4.086 (0.125)** 3.554 (0.519)**
-Directly at point of care (reference) −0.595 (0.091)** −0.452 (0.135)** −4.086 (0.125)** −3.554 (0.519)**
Alternative specific constant
-Opt-out option 4.306 (0.141)** 1.491 (0.322)** 1.086 (0.036)** 0.545 (0.251)*
SD of random parameters
Copayments 2.467 (0.123)** – 3.333 (0.096)** 3.307 (0.445)**
Rate1 a −0.995 (0.133)** 0.855 (0.288)** −0.869 (0.051)** 1.126 (0.168)**
Rate2 a 0.017 (0.213) 0.001 (0.001) −0.400 (0.075)** −0.266 (0.326)
Afterwards billed by health insurer 1.801 (0.098)** – 4.929 (0.139)** 4.478 (0.594)**
Model
Number of individuals 662 662 4702 4702
Number of observations 11,916 11,916 84,636 84,636
Log-likelihood − 2172.120 − 3287.581 −17,658.000 −12,680.018
Model: mixed multinomial logits modelling eq. 1. Random parameters assumed a normal distribution and estimated based on 5000 Halton draws
SE Standard Error, SD Standard Deviation
a labels Specialist care: rate1 (€100/5%), rate2 (€140/7%), rate3 (€200/10%)
* = p-value≤.05, ** = p-value≤.01
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important attribute (type of payments) and the prefer-
ence for copayments, respondents of the group forgoing
health care were less likely to use health care in the
current program (i.e. overall, coefficients had negative
signs implying that coinsurances negatively affected the
decision to use health care). In contrast, respondents of
the group utilizing health care considered the attribute
moment of payments as most important and preferred the
afterwards billing of cost-sharing payments (i.e. all coeffi-
cients had positive signs). Their preferences corresponded
with the current program and explain why these respon-
dents were more likely to use health care.
Fourth, the response to cost-sharing programs may be
even more heterogeneous in the real-world considering
the distribution of respondents’ characteristics between
the two groups (see Table 2) and the positive correlation
between the utility derived from attributes and these
characteristics (shown in sensitivity analyses). Estimated
preferences are in line with observed real-life decisions
and give credence to our study results.
Last, preferences shifted in both groups from copay-
ments for medication and diagnostic tests, to coinsur-
ances for specialist care (see Tables 3, 4 and 5). Analysis
of open-ended questions (see Additional file 4) suggested
that many respondents were unaware of actual prices of
health care and were least aware of prices for specialist
care. Research has reported limited price awareness in
other countries where many efforts have been made to
increase price transparency [32, 33]. In the Netherlands,
similar initiatives have been implemented but our results
suggest that price information has not reached all poten-
tial users. Our study further underscores the importance
of price information as it is crucial to improve adherence
to recommended care in any cost-sharing program. In
the context of bundled payments, price information is
also important to stimulate the use of in-bundled care
(in-network providers) via cost-sharing. For example,
individuals may pay an additional copayment equal to
the difference in price of care provided by in-network
and out-of-network providers. Individuals require price
information to make well-informed decisions about the
use of out-of-network providers.
Considerations
Our study showed the extent to which design character-
istics of cost-sharing programs affect the decision of in-
dividuals to use care recommended by the treating
physicians. However, a few assumptions in our study
may not fully hold in real-life settings. First, respondents
were assumed to have basic health literacy skills, i.e. be
able to obtain, process, and understand health informa-
tion and services necessary to make health decisions
[11]. National surveys in the US have demonstrated
below-basic health literacy skills in 14% of the surveyed
adults and proficient levels in 12% of this population
[34]. In the Netherlands, similar levels of health literacy
skills have been observed among the labor work force
(11% below-basic level; 17% proficient level) [35]. An op-
timally designed cost-sharing program will improve ad-
herence to recommended care among individuals having
forgone health care due to deductibles but more
interventions are required to achieve its full effect. One
possible intervention is to improve patient activation;
engaged individuals seek and use health information
through various sources which may compensate a
low-level in health literacy [11, 36].
Second, we assumed that referrals for recommended
health services were solely based on the health status of
individuals and did not account for possible
supply-induced demand or supply-induced moral
hazard. Research has shown that providers may respond
to payment systems although experts consider evidence
not to be completely convincing [37]. Limited research
conducted in the Netherlands suggests presence of some
supply-induced demand in both hospital care and GP
care with differences in extent across treatments,
between salaried paid physicians and those reimbursed
based on output, and between subgroups of insured
individuals [38, 39]. Therefore, the extent to which ex-
pected and real-life demand-response differs due to this
assumption remains unclear.
Third, we assumed that use of health services will
always have the same medical benefits and that not
using them will always have adverse health effects. Both
assumptions will unlikely be true in real-life situation.
Fourth, given our research aim, we focused solely on
cost-sharing programs (i.e. design characteristics) and
explicitly did not include other relevant aspects of the
given health services (e.g. quality of care) as attributes.
In accordance with DCE methodology, we used the
ceteris paribus assumption in the choice sets by asking
respondents to choose their preferred option in each
choice set while keeping all other relevant factors
constant. This assumption is likely to hold even if re-
spondents implicitly correlated expenditure with qual-
ity and access, because expenditure levels differed
little in our choice-sets. A systematic review focused
on DCE studies concluded that in patients’ prefe-
rences with respect to cancer treatment outcome at-
tributes (e.g. adverse effects) are considered the most
important attributes relative to process (e.g. involve-
ment in clinical decision-making) and costs (i.e. out-
of-pocket costs) attributes. Hence, we expect that, if
quality levels were included as attributes in our DCE,
insured individuals would have been willing to pay
higher cost-sharing payments for health services of
high quality of care, i.e. relative importance of cost-
sharing payments decreases [40].
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Last, although relatively low in the Netherlands
compared to those in the US, out-of-pocket payments
as a share of Gross Domestic Product has increased
in the last decade (from 2006 to 2015, NL 0.8–1.3%;
US 2.0–1.9%). In the US, the share of adults (aged
19–64) who reported not using health care due to
costs has dropped to 36% in 2014 after consecutive
years of increase (from 2003 to 2012, 37–43%) [41].
Again lower than in the US, the share of Dutch
citizens reporting having forgone health care due to
costs is still increasing (5% in 2007; 8% in 2016) [42].
Given these trends, demand-response observed in the
Dutch health system is expected to be commensu-
rable to response observed in other health systems.
Limitations
A few study limitations should be considered. First,
our study population was possibly not representative
for the Dutch population (e.g. older, higher educa-
tional levels). As shown in our IPW analyses, results
may not generalizable to the whole population in
terms of absolute effect magnitudes. However, the
observed direction of coefficients based on a weighted
representative sample remained unchanged. This
indicates that our results are generalizable to the total
population in terms of observed mechanism (i.e. less
complex programs improve adherence to care recom-
mended by the treating physician in all health
systems). Similarly, we expect the absolute effect
magnitudes to be health-system dependent (i.e. the
observed magnitude of the mechanism will differ
between health systems) yet we expect the underlying
mechanism to be universal across health systems as
the direction of demand-response to cost-sharing is
considered to be universal (i.e. higher cost-sharing re-
duces demand of care). Moreover, although not repre-
sentative for the total population, our respondents are
frequent users of care and thus more likely to be
faced with cost-sharing payments. This feature
increases the internal validity of our findings as the
observed response to cost-sharing may resemble ac-
tual behavior of individuals in real-life settings more
closely.
Second, randomization was not possible in the survey
tool. Instead, respondents were assigned to different
blocks of the questionnaire based on regions. Although
some differences in respondents’ characteristics and
preferences were found across blocks, these differences
did not affect our general findings.
Conclusions
If cost-sharing programs are redesigned in such a way
that individuals have clear information on cost-shar-
ing payments in advance (i.e. copayments instead of
coinsurances) and these payments are then billed by
the health insurer (i.e. afterwards billed by health in-
surer instead of payments at point of care), adherence
to recommended care may be stimulated in specific
subgroups. Representative study samples are necessary
to obtain absolute effect magnitudes, while this mech-
anism is expected to be universal across health sys-
tems. Redesigned programs provide a policy option to
possibly reduce adverse health effects of cost-sharing
in these groups. Considering the upcoming shift from
volume-based to value-based health care provision, in-
sights into cost-sharing program design characteristics
that stimulates the use of recommended care may
help to design value-based insurance plans. This study
underscores the importance of price information as it
is crucial to improve the use of recommended care in
any cost-sharing program.
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